Notes to Temmerman (1997, 2000)

Temmerman (1997 and 2000) is about the theory of Terminology. One can of course do work with terminology without having studied it theoretically (just as one can speak a language without studying it at a university). In general, however, it is to be expected that practice is improved by a good theory. Temmerman's main point is that the theory that has guided work in terminology so far is not optimal, and he outlines some principle which may improve the theory of terminology.

The paper is difficult to read. This is partly due to the naming of lots of theories and concepts which are not properly introduced and a lot of repetition. Partly the difficulties may also be related to underlying unclearness in the theoretical basis (Temmerman's  theory may be developing, and not yet a full-blown theory. I regard her approach as belonging to the same family as I am working with, such as "activity theory", "pragmatic realism" and the "sociocognitive view", which are views that are contrasted to basic assumptions in logical positivism).

A part of the criticism raised by Temmerman is directed towards language planning and standardization (the same may be ideals, e.g. in the design of thesauri in Library and Information Science, LIS). The theories that have been used to support standardization have been too restricted, and the activity of language planning is in itself something which might be problematized. Perhaps the point of view may be interpreted in the following way: Ordinary language is rich and terms are often filled with different meanings. When we standardizes terms, there is a risk that we remove meanings which are fruitful for some purposes. We should not as start from the point of view of logical positivism and regard natural language as noisy and try to replace it with a more logical language, but we should try to understand why it is often a good thing to have, for example, synonyms and polysemy. In general, meanings should not be understood as logical elements in abstract structures, but related to human intentions and interests.

Temmerman (1997) considers two theories "traditional Terminology" and "sociocognitive Terminology".

Temmerman (1997) considers three concepts from the biological domain: "Intron", "blotting" and "biotechnology". Her claim is that traditional Terminology is relevant for considering "Intron", but not for considering "biotechnology". For this last concept is sociocognitive Terminology a better theory. "blotting" is somewhere in between (but closer to sociocognitive Terminology).  It should be said that the idea that different concepts are more or less suited to different theories is supported by, for example, Keil (1989), who suggest that purely formal concepts are well suited for the classical (Aristotelian) view of concepts, while concepts of "natural kinds" are well suited for the prototype theory. In between are concepts of artifacts (such as furniture). It may be that the philosophical tradition has mostly considered mathematical and logical concepts, which may explain why the prototype theory was not developed before the middle of the 20th century.

Quite another question is, however, if Temmerman's (1997) three concepts are well chosen and do reflect the differences, she argues for. 

One way the three concepts are analyzed by Temmerman is be considering their intensions and extensions. (Some concept theories like Bloor (1997) argue against concepts having a set of extensions which can be determined, this is probably a new member in the above mentioned family of theories).

On p. 57 is figure 4, which I in many ways find hard to understand or problematic. According to Ereshefsky (2000) is the species concept ambiguous, why the term "vogel" (bird) also must be ambiguous!  and why are "bird" not also a cognitive category? (and why use the Dutch term: "vogel"?).

Figur five is clear enough (as the authors hypothesis): If a concept is "a classical concept" (= no prototype structure), then univocity is functional. If a concept on the other hand "has prototype structure", then polysemy is functional (and univocity is not functional).

Intron is a certain sequence in DNA molecules. Temmerman interprets on the basis of the literature in the field that this concept regarding intension has a "superordinate concept" and that its "characteristics are possible to delineate from other concepts on the same horizontal level" and  regarding extension that it is possible to enumerate all species or all individual objects that falls under this concept (fig. 7, p. 61). Because of this is it feasible to define the concept with the principles and methods of traditional Terminology.

Blotting  (a biological research method to identify a particular sequence in DNA fragments). Temmerman interprets that this concept regarding intension has a multitude of possible superordinate concepts and that "encyclopedic information is defining the concept/category. Regarding extension finds Temmerman that it is possible to enumerate all species or all individual objects that fall under the concept, "but other information is more relevant". 

Biotechnology (the application of advanced biological techniques in the manufacture of industrial products . . .). Temmerman interprets that this concept regarding intension has not a "superordinate concept" and that its characteristics are not possible to delineate from other concepts on the same horizontal level" and regarding extension that it is not possible to enumerate all species or all individual objects that falls under this concept (fig. 7, p. 61). Because of this is it not feasible to define the concept with the principles and methods of traditional Terminology.

p. 62: "When new phenomena are discovered which can be clearly delineated and traditionally defined there is a natural development towards univocity which in that case favors unambiguous and therefore efficient communication".

p. 68: "Polysemy in language is functional. It is the result of the human reflection about the world"

P. 77: "Slightly different perspectives results in near-synonyms. "

Glossary:

Cognitive semantics. This is a term Temmerman (1997) uses about the theoretical position that she is defending (along with socio-cognitive Terminology).  It is inspired by Lakoff (1987). Cognitive semantics is a part of cognitive linguistics, about Wikipedia (2006) writes: "cognitive linguistics (CL) refers to the currently dominant school of linguistics that views the important essence of language as innately based in evolutionary-developed and speciated faculties, and seeks explanations that advance or fit well into the current understandings of the human mind". (This is changed in very important ways in 2007, almost to the opposite view). See also article "Cognitive semantics" in Wikipedia (2006).

  However, according to Mammen (1994), has Lakoff failed by claiming that concepts do not have objective references. In spite of his claim to be a realist, Lakoff explains concepts by referring to "idealized cognitive models" rather than to objective objects, why he must be regarded an anti-realist in spite of his claim to be a realist. This confusion has not been resolved by Temmerman (1997).

Connotational meaning: refers to a word’s implied, suggested or associated meaning(s) beyond its dictionary definition (opposite of denotative meaning)

Denotational meaning: the literal, dictionary definition of a word (opposite of connotational meaning)

Descriptive, prescreptive & critical Terminology. Temmerman's arguments are against the prescriptive tradition of Terminology and for a more descriptive approach. Perhaps a third possibility is a critical Terminology in which the interests and consequences of different possibilities are uncovered. But will not such a work in some way resemble the prescriptive tradition? One possibility could be to develop vocabularies which describes the many different ways in which a concept is understood such as historical dictionaries, especially the one developed in the tradition of Begriffsgeschichte. (This raises a new question, not considered by Temmerman (1997): Are different kinds of dictionaries an expression of different kind of ideals, corresponding to the "theories" that Temmermann discusses?

Extension of concepts. WordNet 2: " reference: the most direct or specific meaning of a word or expression; the class of objects that an expression refers to; "the extension of `satellite of Mars' is the set containing only Demos and Phobos" ". In a classification system the extension of a class or term are the concepts which are placed in that class.

Functional Linguistics. See: Systemic-Functional Linguistics

Intension of concepts. (Not to be confused with intention, what someone means to say or do). WordNet 2: "intension, connotation (what you must know in order to determine the reference of an expression)". Wikipedia (2005): Intension (or "connotation") refers to the meaning or characteristics encompassed by a given word, often expressed by a definition." In thesauri are intensions often given in scope notes.

Objectivism. The meaning of this term is not clear in this paper. The paper opposes an logical positivist way of understanding but does not relate to, for example, (critical) realism. Indirectly one may infer that objectivism is related to standardization that the meaning of terms should be standardized and that such meanings are independent of their use and intentions. A discussion of the term objectivism can be found in Bryant (2000, 20-28). "Since objectivists maintain that entities and their properties objectively exist, and since the classical view of categorization rests on the (non)possession of properties by entities, the further claim is made that the categories themselves exist objectively. And so the categories into which entities fall also contribute to the structure of the objective world" (p. 21). Bryant is not antirealist, but consider scientific descriptions, models and concepts as choices made among different possible ways to describe the world. 

Prototypical (concepts).  A theory connected to Wittgenstein's late philosophy and research by the psychologist Eleanor Rosch. Wittgenstein's theory is often termed "theory of language games". It is opposed to "the classical view of concepts" (Aristotle) according to which a thing falls under a concept if the necessary and sufficient conditions are fulfilled. Any member of a class is a full member. The prototype theory, on the other hand, claims that some examples are prototypical of a concept. A sparrow is a typical bird, a penguin is not. Members are not equal but better or worse examples. Class membership is defined by similarity with a prototype. Not all members of a class need to share a property with all other members. Sometimes refer Temmerman to prototypical concepts as opposed to "clear-cut" concepts.

Semantic triangle:

  A symbol, e.g. the word "cat" symbolizes (for English speaking readers) the real animal 'cat'. There are thus three elements: the real cat (the referent), the word "cat" (the symbol) and the thought, idea or concept of a cat in the mind of some people (but not all people). Temmerman does not argue against this triangle, on the contrary, he argues that the understanding of this triangle has traditionally been too reduced.

  The triangle expresses relations between:

• language and the world  (or between terms and objects)

• mind and the world  (or between concepts and objects)

• language and mind  (or between terms and concepts)

  These relations are shortly discussed on p. 54. Temmerman is criticizing the traditional approaches for reducing the world, the mind and language. In my opinion this criticism is on the right track, but somewhat unclear due to the antirealist position associated with cognitive semantics. In my opinion has Activity Theory (e.g. Mammen, 1994) a better understanding. According to this theory are both language and the mind reflecting an objective reality, but this reflection is connected to the practical activities of human beings and is historically integrated. Concepts are thus not just arbitrary assignments between clusters of attributes. Activity theory put forward a similar critique of traditional schools as the one Temmerman provides, but is more clearly formulated and avoids the antirealist trap.

Socio-cognitive. This is not properly defined in the paper (but partly in Temmerman 2000, 223). It is said that it is a reaction towards structuralism and "The new socio-cognitive theory of Terminology emphasises that Terminology should not be uniquely oriented towards standardisation and it questions the validity of objectivism as the theoretical underpinning
of terminology." (Temmerman, 1997, p. 54). "Modern socio-cognitive Terminology can benefit from the findings of cognitive semantics which elaborates on the full potential of the interaction between the world, language, and the human mind; and from the insight that the elements of the semantic triangle function in a social setting." (p. 55)

      It is thus only indirectly and vaguely defined.  It is not clear, for example, if this view is related to the way Hjørland (2002) understands the term socio-cognitive, i.e. that meanings are developed in an social context and that the cognitive processes of individuals should mainly be understood as internalizations of processes of social interaction.

Structuralism is one of the theories that Temmerman (1997) argues against. It is a rather important view on language, why a certain background knowledge is useful (See, for example, Post, 1991, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/~postjf/mcich2int.htm#struc). One of the criticism raised against structuralism is that terms and concepts are considered context independent (Temmerman, 1997, p. 53).

Systemic-Functional Linguistics (SFL) is a theory of language centred around the notion of language function. While SFL accounts for the syntactic structure of language, it places the function of language as central (what language does, and how it does it), in preference to more structural approaches, which place the elements of language and their combinations as central. SFL starts at social context, and looks at how language both acts upon, and is constrained by, this social context. http://www.wagsoft.com/Systemics/Definition/definition.html

Terminology (with capital T) The study of terminology; terminology (with small t) is a technical vocabulary, i.e. a collection of terms, which has a certain coherence by the fact that the terms belong to a single subject area.

Traditional terminology is the term used by Temmerman (1997) for different traditions in Terminology that she criticizes and try to formulate an alternative to. Structuralism, Wüsters school in Terminology, the Soviet school, the Prague school and the Canadian centre are mentioned as different schools belonging to "traditional Terminology".

Univocity means that a word always has the same meaning. A univocal word is unambiguous and precise.

Literature:

Bloor, D. (1997). Wittgenstein: Rules and Institutions. London: Routledge.

Bryant, R. (2000). Discovery and decision. Exploring the metaphysics and epistemology of scientific classification. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.

Ereshefsky, M. (2000).The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological Taxonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hjørland, B. (2002), Epistemology and the Socio-Cognitive Perspective in Information Science. Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 53(4), 257-270.

Keil, F. C. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, fire and dangerous things. What categories reveal about the mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mammen, J. (1994). En realistisk begrebsteori: Om forholdet mellem virksomhedsteorien og den økologiske kognitive psykologi. IN: J. Mammen & M. Hedegaard (Red.) Virksomhedsteori i udvikling. Psykologisk Skriftserie Aarhus, 19, 1, 43-58. Available at: http://www.db.dk/jni/lifeboat/Concepts/Mammen_realistisk%20begrebsteori_1994.PDF

Post, J. F. (1991). Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. St. Paul, Minnesota, US:  Paragon House http://www.vanderbilt.edu/~postjf/mcich2int.htm (Visited 07-03-2007) About structuralism: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/~postjf/mcich2int.htm#struc (Visited 07-03-2007)

Temmerman, R. (1997). Questioning the univocity ideal. Hermes. Journal of Linguistics, 18, 51-90. Available at: http://hermes2.asb.dk/archive/FreeH/H18_04.pdf

Temmerman, R. (2000). Towards New Ways of Terminology Description. The Sociocognitive Approach. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. (2005). Intension. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intension

Wikipedia. The free encyclopedia. (2007-03-07). Cognitive linguistics. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_linguistics

Wikipedia. The free encyclopedia. (2007-03-07). Cognitive semantics. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_semantics

Birger Hjørland

Last edited: 07-03-2007

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